The People’s Liberation Army

Category: Government & Politics
Key figures: Zhu De (1886–1976), Peng Dehuai (1898–1974), Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), Lin Biao (1907–1971), Xi Jinping (b. 1953)

Summary

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the armed and paramilitary force of the Communist Party of China, established in 1927 during the Chinese Civil War and formally renamed the People’s Liberation Army in 1949 following the CPC’s victory and the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Uniquely, the PLA is not primarily a state military institution subordinate to the civilian government but rather the armed instrument of the Communist Party itself—a distinction reflecting the Leninist model in which the party maintains ultimate control over all coercive state apparatus. The PLA has evolved from a guerrilla army fighting against the Nationalist KMT to a modern military with nuclear weapons, advanced naval capabilities, and significant roles in domestic security, infrastructure development, and industrial production. Since the 1978 Reform and Opening-up period initiated by Deng Xiaoping, the PLA has undergone extensive modernization, though its subordination to the Communist Party (and, increasingly since 2012, to the personal authority of paramount leader Xi Jinping) has remained absolute. The PLA’s military and extragovernmental functions—from earthquake relief to rural development to surveillance and domestic control—make it not merely a defense force but a central instrument of Communist Party power and legitimacy.

Origins and the Long March (1927–1949)

The PLA’s origins trace to the August 1, 1927 Nanchang Uprising, a failed armed insurrection by CPC forces against the Nationalist KMT in Nanchang (Jiangxi province). Though the uprising was crushed, the date—August 1—became the founding date of what would eventually become the PLA. The early communist forces were fragmented, poorly equipped guerrilla units operating in remote areas, particularly in the Jiangxi Soviet (established 1931–1934).

The most significant and romanticized episode in PLA history is the Long March (1934–1935), when the CPC’s main forces were encircled by the KMT in Jiangxi and were forced to undertake a 6,000-mile retreat northward. The March lasted approximately 368 days, took place across some of China’s harshest terrain, and cost tens of thousands of lives. However, the Long March achieved a strategic objective: it transported the CPC’s revolutionary core to Yan’an in Shaanxi province, where the party could reconstitute itself far from the KMT’s control. The March also saw Mao Zedong’s consolidation of leadership within the party, crystallizing his authority over rival factions.

Under Mao’s leadership and with commanders like Zhu De (1886–1976), the paramount general who built the Red Army into a formidable force, the CPC’s military organization developed a distinctive character. Communist forces emphasized political indoctrination alongside military training, the integration of soldiers into local peasant communities, and guerrilla tactics rather than conventional pitched battles. This approach, born of necessity (the communists initially lacked heavy weapons and formal training), proved effective against the Nationalist KMT, particularly after the Japanese invasion (1937) forced an uneasy KMT-CPC collaboration against the occupier.

Following Japan’s defeat in 1945 and renewed civil war (1946–1949), the CPC’s military forces, by then numbering in the hundreds of thousands, progressively defeated the KMT in a series of major campaigns (the Liaoshen, Huaihai, and Pingjin campaigns of 1948–49). By 1949, the PLA controlled mainland China; the KMT retreated to Taiwan. On October 1, 1949, the People’s Republic was proclaimed, with Mao as paramount leader and the PLA as its armed force.

The Mao Era: Military State (1949–1976)

During Mao’s tenure (1949–1976), the PLA was far more than a military organization. It was a branch of Communist Party power, a tool of social transformation, and an economic actor. The PLA:

• Consolidated CPC rule through military administration, particularly in rural and newly liberated areas where the party’s civilian apparatus was weak
• Participated in the Korean War (1950–1953) as the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, suffering massive casualties in support of North Korea against the UN-led coalition
• Implemented land reform and collectivization campaigns alongside the party, using military discipline and organization
• Operated industrial and agricultural enterprises, making the PLA a significant economic actor in sectors like construction, mining, and food production
• Conducted internal security operations, suppressing remnant Nationalist forces, bandits, and perceived enemies of the regime
• Participated in the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), in which military units often functioned as enforcers of party discipline

The Cultural Revolution, in particular, saw significant PLA involvement. Defense Minister Lin Biao (1907–1971) rose to unprecedented power, and the PLA was tasked with restoring order as Red Guards descended into factional violence. However, Lin Biao’s apparent ambitions to succeed Mao, or his association with military interests, led to a dramatic downfall: in 1971, Lin Biao was accused of conspiracy and died (officially in a plane crash in Mongolia while allegedly fleeing the country).

The Mao era established the PLA as a party institution intertwined with all major state functions, yet highly dependent on Mao’s personal authority. The PLA’s internal political dynamics, succession struggles, and response to Mao’s radical campaigns were central to Chinese political history during this period.

Reform and Modernization (1978 Onward)

When Deng Xiaoping began the Reform and Opening-up program in 1978, the PLA required significant modernization. The Korean War generation of equipment was aging, and China faced advanced adversaries (the Soviet Union) and regional rivals (Vietnam). The PLA in 1978 numbered approximately 6 million personnel—an enormous force that was poorly equipped, lightly trained in conventional warfare, and heavily committed to economic enterprises. Deng initiated a military modernization program emphasizing:

• Reduction in force size while increasing professionalism and training (from roughly 6 million to approximately 2 million active personnel by the 2010s)
• Acquisition of advanced foreign technologies and weapons systems, including aircraft, submarines, and radar from Russia and briefly from Europe before the EU arms embargo (imposed after Tiananmen in 1989)
• Professionalization of officer corps through formal military academies, including the National Defense University
• Separation of military from civilian economic enterprises (the 1998 divestiture order formally removed the PLA from commercial enterprise, though defense-industrial links persisted)
• Participation in international military cooperation and UN peacekeeping operations (China became a significant contributor to UN peacekeeping forces from the 1990s onward)

The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War (February 17 – March 16, 1979), a brief punitive conflict in which China invaded northern Vietnam to “teach a lesson” over Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and alignment with the Soviet Union, demonstrated both the PLA’s organizational capacity and severe technological and tactical shortcomings. Chinese forces suffered significant casualties—estimated at 20,000–30,000 killed or wounded—against well-prepared Vietnamese regulars despite holding strategic initiative, and the conflict prompted urgent reform of training, doctrine, and weapons systems.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the PLA underwent modernization alongside China’s rapid economic growth. Defense spending increased from under $10 billion annually in the early reform period to over $100 billion by the mid-2000s, and has continued growing: China’s official defense budget for 2023 was approximately ¥1.5537 trillion ($225 billion), though Western analysts estimate actual military spending may be 50–100% higher when research, development, and paramilitary costs are included.

Key capability developments during this period included:

• Naval expansion: Acquisition of Russian Kilo-class submarines, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and domestic development of Type 052 destroyer classes; beginning of carrier program research
• Air power: Purchase of Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30 fighters from Russia; domestic development of the J-10 and J-11 (a licensed Su-27 variant) fighters
• Missile forces: Continued development of ballistic missile capabilities, including the DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile (widely called a “carrier killer”) and the DF-41 ICBM with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)

The PLA’s economic involvement, while formally reduced after 1998, did not cease entirely. Defense industries, telecommunications companies, and dual-use technology enterprises maintained connections to PLA research institutes and procurement structures, blurring the line between military and civilian economic activity in ways that later became central to the “civil-military fusion” (jun-min ronghe) policy under Xi Jinping.

The Tiananmen Crackdown (1989) and Its Aftermath

The PLA played a crucial role in the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement. After weeks of student occupation and civilian protests, the Communist Party leadership ordered military intervention. On June 3–4, 1989, PLA units, particularly the 27th Group Army, moved into Beijing with tanks and armed troops, forcibly clearing the square and adjacent areas. The operation resulted in hundreds to thousands of deaths (the exact toll remains disputed and heavily censored in China).

The Tiananmen crackdown demonstrated the PLA’s absolute subordination to the party leadership’s decision to use force and the party’s willingness to deploy the military against domestic dissent. It also resulted in sanctions against China from Western governments and complicated China’s military modernization through reduced foreign technology access.

The Xi Jinping Era: Party Control Intensified (2012 Onward)

Since Xi Jinping’s accession to power in 2012, the PLA has undergone the most sweeping structural transformation since the 1950s, with intensified emphasis on party control and Xi’s personal authority. Xi, who holds the positions of General Secretary of the Communist Party, President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission simultaneously, has brought the PLA under even tighter control through:

• Military structural reforms (2015–2016): The old seven military region system was replaced by five Theater Commands (战区, zhànqū), each responsible for joint operations in its geographic area: Eastern (focused on Taiwan and East China Sea), Southern (South China Sea and Southeast Asia), Western (Central Asia and India), Northern (Russia, Korea), and Central (national capital defense). Simultaneously, the service branches (ground, navy, air, rocket) were separated from operational command and made responsible for training and equipping forces—a joint warfare model inspired partly by US combatant command structures
• Anti-corruption campaigns: Xi’s anti-corruption drive targeted senior military officers as prominently as civilian officials. Generals Xu Caihou (former CMC vice-chair) and Guo Boxiong (also a former CMC vice-chair)—both of whom had held the PLA’s highest rank—were prosecuted on corruption charges in 2014–2015, with Xu dying of cancer before sentencing. Dozens of other senior officers were removed, allowing Xi to install loyalists in key commands
• Ideological campaigns: The “Marxist” and “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military” (习近平强军思想) was made mandatory study for all PLA personnel, with the General Political Department upgraded to ensure party loyalty monitoring permeated every unit
• Aircraft carrier program: China commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning (Type 001, a refurbished Soviet Kuznetsov-class vessel purchased from Ukraine), in 2012. The first domestically built carrier, Shandong (Type 002), was commissioned in 2019. The third, Fujian (Type 003), a catapult-equipped vessel closer in capability to the US Nimitz class, was launched in 2022 and began sea trials in 2023—representing a qualitative leap in blue-water capability
• Stealth fighters: The J-20 stealth fighter entered PLA Air Force service in 2017, making China the second country after the United States to field a fifth-generation stealth combat aircraft
• Civil-Military Fusion (军民融合, jūn-mín rónghé): A Xi-era policy formalizing the integration of defense and civilian technology development, requiring private technology companies to share innovations with the military and incentivizing universities and research institutes to work on dual-use technology—a comprehensive approach to ensuring the PLA benefits from China’s technology boom without funding it entirely from defense budgets

Under Xi, Western intelligence assessments estimate the PLA’s nuclear stockpile has grown from approximately 200 warheads in 2010 to an estimated 350–500 by the mid-2020s, with a stated goal of 1,500 warheads by 2035. The combination of expanded nuclear capacity, aircraft carrier forces, advanced missile systems, and space and cyber warfare capabilities has made the PLA a full-spectrum peer competitor to the US military—a transformation China’s leadership describes as achieving a “world-class military” by 2049, the centenary of the PRC’s founding.

Contemporary Functions and Structure

The PLA today comprises:

• People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF): The largest component, responsible for land-based defense and domestic security
• People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN): Expanding maritime forces, including aircraft carrier operations and advanced submarines, focused on regional dominance in the South China Sea and potential Taiwan contingency
• People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF): Advanced jet aircraft, air defense systems, and strategic bombers, with expanding global reach
• People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF): Strategic missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with nuclear warheads
• Space, cyber, and information forces: Established in 2015 as the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) to consolidate space, cyber, and electronic-warfare capabilities, this component was reorganized in April 2024, when the PLASSF was dissolved and its missions redistributed among three new arms reporting directly to the Central Military Commission—the Aerospace Force, the Cyberspace Force, and the Information Support Force

Beyond formal military structures, the PLA participates in:

• Domestic security: Paramilitary forces and internal security operations alongside the People’s Armed Police (PAP), a separate but related force under PLA influence
• Foreign operations: Military attachés, overseas military bases (particularly the Djibouti base established 2017), and international military cooperation
• Civil-military fusion: Research and development in dual-use technologies, industrial production, and infrastructure projects
• Disaster relief and development: Large-scale mobilization for earthquakes, floods, and rural development projects, bolstering the CPC’s public legitimacy

The PLA and Party Control

A defining characteristic of the PLA is its subordination to the Communist Party rather than to formal state institutions (the National People’s Congress, the presidency, or the State Council). The Central Military Commission, headed by Xi Jinping, exercises command authority over all armed forces. This structure reflects the Leninist principle that “the party commands the gun, and the gun shall never command the party”—a formulation attributed to Mao. In practice, this has meant that the PLA has never acted as an independent political force seeking to seize state power (as has occurred in other military-dominated societies), but it has exercised significant influence within party deliberations and has been a site of internal factional competition.

The relationship between the PLA and the party is symbiotic: the party depends on the PLA for its monopoly on coercive force and for domestic security, while the PLA depends on the party for legitimacy, budgetary support, and integration into the state. Over time, the PLA’s identity as a revolutionary guerrilla force has given way to its role as a professional military establishment and an instrument of state power under communist party aegis.

Related

• The Communist Party of China — the party that commands and controls the PLA as its armed instrument.
• Mao Zedong — founder of the PLA and paramount leader during its formative decades.
• Deng Xiaoping — architect of military modernization and reform beginning in 1978.
• Xi Jinping — current paramount leader who has intensified party control over the PLA and accelerated military modernization.
• The Chinese Civil War — the 1927–1950 conflict in which the PLA defeated the Nationalist KMT.
• The Long March — the 1934–1935 retreat that established Mao’s leadership and enabled the CPC’s survival.
• The Cultural Revolution — the radical upheaval in which the PLA played a major internal security and order-restoration role.
• The 1989 Tiananmen Square Pro-Democracy Movement — the protest the PLA violently suppressed, demonstrating absolute party control.
• The Standing Committee of the Politburo — the party organ through which the paramount leader exercises command over the PLA.
• Regional Autonomy — system in which the PLA assists in governance of ethnic-minority regions.

Sources

• Shambaugh, David. China’s Military in Transition. American Enterprise Institute Press, 2012. Comprehensive analysis of PLA modernization and reform.
• Goldstein, Lyle J. Meeting China’s Security Dilemma: A Responsible Regional Power and Its Regional Military Posture. Council on Foreign Relations, 2007. Examines PLA doctrine and strategic thinking.
• Fravel, M. Taylor. Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949. Princeton University Press, 2019. Historical examination of PLA strategy and doctrine evolution.
• Mulvenon, James C., and Richard D. Fisher Jr. (eds.). The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011. Multi-author volume on contemporary PLA capabilities.
• Ellis, R. Evan. China on the Ground in Latin America: Challenges for the US and Opportunities for Cooperation. Council on Foreign Relations, 2011. Includes discussion of China’s military expansion and PLA overseas operations.