Lee Myung-bak

Lee Myung-bak (이명박; born 1941) served as President of South Korea from 2008 to 2013, the tenth person to hold the office. Before his presidency, he was the mayor of Seoul (2002–2006), where he led the restoration of the Cheonggyecheon stream and an overhaul of the city’s public-transit system. His presidency was characterized by ambitious megaprojects, free-market ideologies, and hardline stances toward North Korea, but was followed by imprisonment for corruption scandals that became emblematic of South Korean justice and corporate-political entanglement.

Early Life and Business Career

Lee Myung-bak was born on December 19, 1941, in Osaka, Japan, during the Japanese colonial period when many Koreans lived and worked in the Japanese home islands under colonial labor systems. His family returned to Korea after liberation in 1945 and settled in Pohang, North Gyeongsang Province—a provincial city that later became an industrial hub anchored by POSCO’s steel complex (see chaebol).

Lee studied business administration (economics/commerce) at Korea University, graduating in 1965. Korea University is one of the SKY universities—Seoul National University, Korea University, and Yonsei University—whose graduates dominate Korean professional, political, and business hierarchies (see education and universities). His campus activism as a student council leader brought him into contact with the politics of the democratization era and briefly led to his arrest for participating in protests against the Japan-Korea normalization treaty (1964–65) under Park Chung-hee.

Immediately after graduation, Lee joined Hyundai Engineering and Construction (현대건설), the construction arm of the Hyundai conglomerate, which was then building South Korea’s highways, bridges, and heavy industrial infrastructure at breakneck speed under Park’s export-led development model. Lee rose rapidly through the firm: he became CEO of Hyundai Construction in 1977 at age 35—one of the youngest CEOs of a major Korean firm. Under his leadership, Hyundai Construction won major international contracts in the Middle East during the oil boom of the 1970s, expanding the firm’s revenue and global presence. By the time he left the private sector to enter politics in the early 1990s, Lee had built Hyundai Construction into one of South Korea’s most prominent construction conglomerates and accumulated substantial personal wealth and business connections.

Mayor of Seoul (2002–2006)

Lee was elected Mayor of Seoul in the June 2002 local elections and served a single four-year term through June 2006. His tenure was defined by two high-profile urban projects—the restoration of the Cheonggyecheon stream and a wholesale reform of the city’s bus network—that built his reputation as a decisive, results-driven administrator and propelled him toward the presidency.

Cheonggyecheon Stream Restoration

Lee’s signature achievement as mayor was the Cheonggyecheon Stream Restoration Project (청계천 복원사업; 2003–2005), the removal of an aging elevated highway and the daylighting of the Cheonggyecheon stream that runs through central Seoul. The stream had been covered over and built upon since the 1950s–60s, and restoring it created a 5.8-km public waterway and greenbelt through the historic city center. The project cost approximately 900 billion won and was completed in September 2005, drawing international urban-planning attention and domestic acclaim—though critics noted that it displaced small merchants, accelerated gentrification in the surrounding Jongno area, and left a stream sustained by pumped water rather than natural flow.

Transit Reform and Governance

Lee also oversaw a sweeping overhaul of Seoul’s public transportation in 2004, introducing a network of dedicated median bus lanes (a bus rapid transit, or BRT, system) on central arterials, colour-coded bus routes, and an integrated, distance-based fare system with seamless transfers between bus and subway. The reform cut inner-city bus travel times and reshaped commuter patterns, and has since been studied internationally as an urban transit model.

As mayor, Lee cultivated a public image as an efficient administrator and developer who applied business methods to government. Although he had already served in the National Assembly (1992–1998), his corporate background and the visible transformation of Seoul’s cityscape gave him a distinctive, technocratic political brand. That popularity, combined with his Hyundai business success and the recognition of the Hyundai name, positioned him as the Grand National Party (GNP) presidential front-runner as early as 2005.

Presidency (2008–2013)

Lee was elected president on December 19, 2007, receiving 48.7% of the vote—a landslide in a 12-candidate field where his nearest rival, Chung Dong-young of the United New Democratic Party, received only 26.1%. The margin was the largest in any South Korean presidential election since the country’s democratization. He took office on February 25, 2008, succeeding Roh Moo-hyun (an ally of Kim Dae-jung who had pursued the “Sunshine Policy” of North Korean engagement). Lee’s presidency was divided into distinct policy phases: early megaprojects and bold economic programs, a hardline foreign policy toward North Korea, and later years marked by popular resistance and, ultimately, post-presidency scandal.

Four Major Rivers Project (4대강 사업)

The signature initiative of Lee’s presidency was the Four Major Rivers Project (4대강 사업; sa-dae-gang saeop). Launched in 2008, the project aimed to develop and beautify four river systems—the Han, Nakdong, Geum, and Yeongsan rivers—through dams, bridges, waterways, and recreational areas. Estimated costs were approximately 22 trillion won ($22 billion USD at the time).

The project was justified as addressing water security, flood control, and regional development, and it was framed as an extension of Lee’s Seoul development philosophy to the national level. However, the project became deeply controversial:

• Environmental critics argued that the dams altered river ecosystems, disrupted fish migration, and contradicted environmental protection laws.
• Opposition politicians and civil society saw the project as wasteful spending and a boondoggle that enriched construction firms (including chaebol associates) while damaging natural heritage.
• Scientific disputes emerged over projected benefits, water quality, and the need for some dams.

Despite the opposition, the government pushed the Four Major Rivers Project to completion by 2012. The dams were constructed, and the project symbolized Lee’s development-first agenda and construction-sector patronage. Post-presidency, environmental assessments and government audits revealed concerns about algal blooms and ecological damage, vindicating some critics.

Foreign Policy and North Korea

Lee pursued a MB Doctrine in foreign policy emphasizing:

• Hardline stance toward North Korea — labeled the “MB Doctrine,” Lee rejected the previous “Sunshine Policy” of diplomatic engagement. He introduced the concept of “MB Diplomacy” predicated on reciprocal benefits: South Korean aid and inter-Korean projects would be conditioned on North Korean denuclearization.
• US-South Korea alliance strengthening — Lee reaffirmed the alliance and agreed to increase South Korea’s military spending. The deployment of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) was renegotiated.
• Global diplomacy — Lee promoted South Korea’s role in global governance and hosted the 2010 G20 Summit in Seoul.

The hardline stance meant that inter-Korean projects stalled, and relations with North Korea deteriorated. The Kaesong Industrial Complex, a joint North-South business zone established under prior administrations, continued to operate but remained politically contentious.

Economic Policy

Lee’s economic ideology emphasized free-market principles, deregulation, and corporate tax cuts. He continued the neoliberal trajectory established under prior administrations but accelerated privatization of state enterprises and reduced regulations on business. The global financial crisis of 2008–2009 occurred early in his presidency, and Lee’s administration pursued stimulus spending (partly through the Four Major Projects) to offset contraction.

2008 Candlelight Protests and Beef Controversy

Within months of taking office, Lee’s government faced its first major crisis: massive street protests over the U.S. beef import controversy. The government had negotiated a trade agreement with the United States that resumed imports of American beef—halted since 2003 following BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy / mad cow disease) cases in the U.S. The terms of the agreement, announced in April 2008, were seen by critics as overly permissive: the agreement allowed bone-in beef cuts that many Koreans feared could carry prion contamination.

From May to July 2008, candlelight vigils drew hundreds of thousands of people to central Seoul, with the largest single demonstration estimated at 100,000 participants in early June 2008. The protests were organized largely through online communities and high school students and evolved into broader anti-government demonstrations questioning Lee’s governance style and subservience to U.S. economic interests. Clashes between demonstrators and riot police received extensive media coverage.

Lee’s administration renegotiated minor terms of the beef agreement and ultimately maintained it, and the protests faded by late summer 2008. The episode revealed the limits of Lee’s electoral mandate and the activism of Korean civil society, and foreshadowed the candlelight protest culture that would later end Park Geun-hye’s presidency in 2016–17.

The Cheonan Sinking (March 2010) and Yeonpyeong Shelling (November 2010)

Two major North Korean military provocations defined the security dimension of Lee’s second half in office. On March 26, 2010, the South Korean naval corvette ROKS Cheonan (천안함) sank in the Yellow Sea near Baengnyeong Island, killing 46 sailors. A multinational investigation—the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG) including experts from the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Sweden—concluded in May 2010 that a North Korean submarine had fired a torpedo at the ship. North Korea denied responsibility.

Lee responded with the May 24 Measures: South Korea suspended inter-Korean trade (excluding the Kaesong Industrial Complex), halted South Korean investment in the North, and blocked North Korean shipping from South Korean territorial waters. The measures were a significant rupture in inter-Korean economic relations and reinforced Lee’s credibility with the conservative base.

On November 23, 2010, North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island, a South Korean island in the Yellow Sea, killing two marines and two civilians and injuring 19 others. The attack was the first direct artillery strike on South Korean territory since the Korean War armistice. South Korea returned fire, and the incident brought both militaries briefly to heightened alert. The Yeonpyeong shelling further consolidated public support for Lee’s hardline stance and accelerated defense spending reviews. See North Korea relations for the broader arc of peninsular security.

Post-Presidency and Scandals

After leaving office on February 25, 2013, Lee became ensnared in a series of legal scandals that revealed extensive corruption and corporate-political malfeasance. He was the first former president since Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo (both convicted in 1996 and later pardoned) to face serious criminal charges post-presidency. South Korea had by then seen four consecutive presidents either imprisoned or criminally investigated—a pattern illustrating the structural entanglement of chaebol money and presidential power documented in the democratization literature.

Investigations and Prosecutions

The investigations into Lee accelerated after his successor Park Geun-hye (2013–2017) was impeached in December 2016 and imprisoned in 2017, weakening the conservative political bloc that had shielded him. Prosecutors investigated Lee on several interconnected fronts:

• Secret ownership of DAS — the central allegation was that Lee was the true owner of DAS, an automobile-parts manufacturer nominally registered in relatives’ and associates’ names through a borrowed-name (차명; chamyeong) structure, concealing his beneficial ownership. Prosecutors alleged that he had embezzled roughly 24.6 billion won from the company over years and diverted its funds and personnel to his own benefit.
• Bribery from Samsung — Lee was accused of receiving approximately 6 billion won from Samsung’s legal team in connection with the presidential pardon of Samsung Chairman Lee Kun-hee, issued by Lee in December 2009.
• Embezzlement of national intelligence service funds — allegations that government intelligence slush funds were diverted for personal and political use.
• Real estate and business conflicts of interest — various dealings during both his mayoral and presidential terms.

Lee maintained his innocence throughout, characterizing the prosecutions as politically motivated retribution by the liberal Moon Jae-in administration (which took office in May 2017 after Park’s impeachment).

Imprisonment and Pardon

Lee was arrested on March 22, 2018—five years after leaving office—and held in pretrial detention. On October 5, 2018, the Seoul Central District Court convicted him of bribery and embezzlement and sentenced him to 15 years in prison. He was released on bail in March 2019 due to health concerns, then returned to prison after appeals failed.

The Seoul High Court increased the sentence to 17 years in February 2020, and the Supreme Court (대법원) upheld the full 17-year conviction in October 2020.

On December 27, 2022, President Yoon Suk-yeol—a conservative elected in March 2022—issued Lee a special presidential pardon, citing his advanced age (81) and deteriorating health. The pardon generated significant public controversy: critics argued it continued the cycle of presidential impunity in which former Korean leaders ultimately evade full accountability, while supporters characterized it as a humanitarian gesture for an elderly former head of state.

Political Impact and Legacy of Scandal

Lee’s post-presidency scandals illustrated the structural entanglement of chaebol wealth, political influence, and presidential power in South Korea. His prosecution mirrored patterns established by Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo (both convicted in 1996 for treason and corruption) and Park Geun-hye (convicted in 2018), establishing South Korea’s troubling record as one of the few democracies where a majority of recent presidents have faced criminal conviction after leaving office. The scandals raised systemic questions:

• Anti-corruption enforcement gaps — criminal activity during presidencies went uninvestigated until political transitions enabled prosecutions.
• Presidential pardons as impunity instruments — each imprisoned former president eventually received a presidential pardon, suggesting that full accountability was politically unsustainable across administrations.
• Chaebol-political funding symbiosis — the DAS and Samsung bribery allegations showed that the construction and electronics conglomerates had maintained systematic funding relationships with presidents as a form of political insurance.
• Partisan prosecution dynamics — liberals prosecuted Lee; conservatives pardoned him. The pattern raised questions about whether justice was outcome-determined by political alignment.

Despite legal troubles, Lee retained a following within the conservative Saenuri/PPP political bloc and was seen as a formative figure in the construction of modern Korean conservatism—a tradition emphasizing development, security, and market liberalism.

Legacy and Evaluation

Development and Infrastructure

Lee’s legacy centers on massive infrastructure projects—the Cheonggyecheon Stream Restoration and Seoul BRT as mayor, and the Four Major Rivers Project as president. Supporters credited him with modernizing South Korea’s infrastructure, completing ambitious visions, and demonstrating that bold executive action could transform landscapes in compressed timescales. Critics saw the Four Major Rivers Project in particular as environmentally destructive, financially wasteful, and driven by construction-sector patronage rather than genuine public need. Post-presidency environmental audits confirmed algal blooms, reduced water flow, and ecological disruption in rivers affected by the project’s weirs.

The Cheonggyecheon Restoration stands on more favorable terms: it is widely credited as a successful urban renewal model and has inspired similar projects in other East Asian cities.

Presidential Style and Historical Position

Lee’s presidency reflected his background as a chaebol executive and construction CEO. He pursued megaprojects with confidence, speed, and a top-down implementation style that left little room for environmental review or civic opposition. His administration’s dismissal of experts who challenged the Four Major Rivers Project became a symbol of governance by conviction rather than evidence.

In foreign policy, his hardline reversal of the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea shaped the trajectory of inter-Korean relations for the following decade: the Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong shelling during his term, and the subsequent freezing of most North-South cooperation, defined the security environment that Park Geun-hye (2013–17) and Moon Jae-in (2017–22) inherited. See North Korea relations for the full arc.

Place in the Presidential Accountability Pattern

Lee was the fourth consecutive South Korean president either to face criminal conviction or to resign under legal pressure (following Chun Doo-hwan, Roh Tae-woo, and—by the time his case concluded—Park Geun-hye). The pattern reveals deep structural problems in South Korean presidential government structure: the single five-year non-renewable term creates a lame-duck dynamic that limits accountability during office, while post-presidential criminal exposure reflects unresolved tensions between chaebol money and democratic governance documented in the democratization literature.

Related

• Park Chung-hee — Development-state president whose Hyundai-era industrial drive launched Lee’s construction career.
• Kim Dae-jung — Architect of the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea that Lee reversed in office.
• Chaebol (Korean Conglomerates) — Corporate power and political funding at the center of the DAS and Samsung bribery cases.
• Government Structure of South Korea — The presidency, the five-year single term, and the courts that convicted him.
• South Korea–North Korea Relations and Inter-Korean Diplomacy — The MB Doctrine, the Cheonan sinking, the Yeonpyeong shelling, and the May 24 Measures.
• Democratization of South Korea — The democratic consolidation and the recurring pattern of presidential prosecution.
• Seoul — The Cheonggyecheon restoration and transit reform of Lee’s mayoralty.
• Sports and the Olympic Games — The 1988 and 2018 Olympics, the latter bid secured during Lee’s presidency.
• Moon Jae-in — Progressive successor (once removed) who reversed Lee’s hardline North Korea posture.
• Yoon Suk-yeol — As Seoul’s chief prosecutor, oversaw the case that convicted Lee; as president, pardoned him in December 2022.
• Roh Moo-hyun — Lee’s progressive predecessor, whom Lee’s incoming administration investigated after 2008.
• Park Geun-hye — His conservative successor and 2007 GNP-primary rival, later impeached and convicted of corruption.